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INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS
EDITED BY BERNARD H. OXMAN
GA 77-Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement-asbestos import ban-national treatment-like
products-health measures--rivat e-)arty submissions to WT dispute settlement bodies
EUROI'EAN COMM UNITIES--MEASURESAFFECTIN(; ASBESTOS AN) ASBESTOS-CONTAINING PROD-
U(r's. WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R. At <http://wv.w to.org/english/tratop-e/dispu..e/
dispue.htm>.
World Trade Organization Appellate Body, March 12, 2001.
In European Communities-Measures AffectingAsbestos and Asbestos-ContainingProducts, Canada
challenged a French decree banning the importation of asbestos and products containing
all forms of that substance. First before a panel' of the World Trade Organization's Dispute
Settlement Body and subsequently before the Appellate Body,2 Canada alleged violations of
the national treatment obligation in Article III of GATT 1994, ' of the prohibition on quanti-
tative restrictions in Article XI, and of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT
Agreement).4 France maintained that the embargo wasjustified by scientific evidence that
exposure to asbestos can cause serious illnesses, including lung cancer, mesothelioma (an-
other malignant illness with high mortality rates, for which the only known cause is exposure
to asbestos), and asbestosis (a nonmalignant illness with symptoms similar to emphysema). The
French measure allows a limited exception for products containing chrysotile asbestos, for
which alternatives that present a lesser health risk are not available.
The WTO panel that initially considered the dispute determined that non-asbestos al-
ternatives to asbestos and asbestos-containing products are "like products" within the
meaning of Article 111:4 of GATT 1994.' It concluded that the French measure wasjustified,
however, under the chapeau and paragraph (b) of Article XX as "necessary to protect
human.., life or health. ' It also found that the asbestos ban was not governed by the TBT
'European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc. WT/
DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000). Reports of the panels and Appellate Body, as well as other WTO dispute settlement
documents, are available online at <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-ie/dispu-.e.htm>.
2 European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc. Wr/
DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter Appellate Body report].
'General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex IA [hereinafter GATT 1994], THE LEGALTEXTS: THE RESULTSOFTHE URUGUAYROUND
OF MULTILATERALTRADE NEGOTIATIONS 21 (1994) [hereinafter RESULTS], reprinted in 33 ILM 1154 (1994).
4 Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, RESULTS, supra
note 3, at 138, availableat <http://www.wto.org/english/do,-s.e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf> [hereinafter TBT Agreement].
' Article 111:4 of GATT 1994 provides:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting
party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin
in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of dif-
ferential internal transportation charges which are based exclusivelyon the economic operation of the means
of transport and not on the nationality of the product.
'Article XX of GATT 1994, entitled "General Exceptions," provides, in relevant part:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
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Agreement7 because the ban is not a "technical regulation" within the meaning of that agree-
ment. Canada appealed with respect to the panel's interpretation of the TBT Agreement
and the Article XX exception. The European Communities, on behalf of France, cross-
appealed as to the Article III national treatment ruling.
The Appellate Body's report upheld the panel's result, but modified its reasoning. Most
notably, the Appellate Body, after criticizing the panel's analysis, concluded that alternatives
that do not contain asbestos are not "like products"' for the purposes of GATT Article 111:4.
The panel had examined two different categories of products to determine whether they
are "like" for the purposes of Article 111:4: other fibers, such as polyvinyl alcohol, cellulose,
and glass; and non-asbestos-containing products, such as cement containing one of these
alternative fibers in place of asbestos. After noting that the instant dispute was the first in
which it was called upon to address the meaning of "like products" in Article 111:4, the Ap-
pellate Body observed that the numerous uses of that term elsewhere in WTO agreements
could be helpful in interpreting the provision at issue in this dispute. The term "like prod-
ucts" is also, for example, used in Article 111:2, which deals with internal taxes. Although
there are textual differences between that provision and Article 111:4, the Appellate Body
noted that the general principle expressed in Article III: 1-to avoid protectionism by ensur-
ing the equality of competitive positions-is relevant to both. Consequently, the Appellate
Body found that the scope of the two paragraphs is comparable. Moreover, a mere finding
that one group of products is "like" another does not suffice to establish an inconsistency
with Article II1:4; there must also be less favorable treatment of imported products.!
The panel had applied a test for "likeness" derived from a 1970 GATT Working Party Re-
port on Border Tax Adjustments.'" That test turns on four factors designed to evaluate the
competitive relationships between and among products: the properties, nature, and quali-
ties of the products; end uses of the products; consumers' perceptions and behavior; and
the tariff classification of the products. In applying this test, the panel stressed a market-
access approach and found that asbestos and alternatives to it are "like products" because
they have the same functions and can be interchanged from the point of view of perfor-
mance. Similarly, end uses for both categories would be similar or identical. In light of this
conclusion, the panel found it unnecessary to examine the third and fourth criteria, con-
sumer preferences and tariff classifications. Significantly, the panel expressly declined to
consider health risks as relevant to the "like product" determination.
The Appellate Body approved the test identified by the panel for determining "likeness,"
but disagreed with the application of that standard. In reversing the panel's conclusion that
asbestos and alternatives to it are "like products," the Appellate Body emphasized the neces-
sity of examining all the evidence in context, including the need to scrutinize physical char-
acteristics as distinct from end uses. Among those physical properties, "carcinogenicity, or
toxicity, constitutes.., a defining aspect of the physical properties of chrysotile asbestos
fibres,"" by comparison with non-asbestos alternatives. The toxic character of the product
is also relevant to the analysis of consumer preferences.
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health[.]
'The TBT Agreement applies to "technical regulations," defined in Annex I of the Agreement as a "document
which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and production methods, including the ap-
plicable administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory."
See Appellate Body report, .%upra note 2, paras. 104-32.
"[A] Member may draw distinctions between products which have been found to be 'like,' without, for this
reason alone, according to the group of 'like' imported products 'less favourable treatment' than that accorded to
the group of 'like' domestic products." Id., para. 100.




The Appellate Body observed that there is some overlap in the end uses for asbestos and its
alternatives, but that there are also many uses for which substitution is not possible. Canada,
considering consumer tastes and preferences to be irrelevant, had provided no evidence on
this question and consequently failed to meet its burden of establishing "likeness." More-
over, the tariff classifications of asbestos and its alternatives are different. The Appellate
Body performed a similar analysis for cement products containing asbestos, concluding that
both the substance itself and products containing it are not "like products" by comparison
with non-asbestos-containing alternatives.'
2
The Appellate Body upheld the panel's conclusion that the exception in Article XX(b)
relating to "human life or health" would, in any event,justify the measure. In rejecting the ar-
guments proposed by Canada, the Appellate Body observed that panels enjoy broad discretion
in the evaluation of questions of scientific "fact." The Appellate Body dismissed Canada's
argument that the risk presented by a carcinogen must be quantified." France's policy of
substituting less risky alternatives for a highly toxic one was also upheld.
Canada had suggested that less burdensome measures similarly protective of public health,
but relying on controlled use of asbestos, ought to be considered in determining whether
the ban is "necessary" under Article XX(b). Based, in part, on the panel's factual findings
that such alternatives would not fully eliminate asbestos-related risk as articulated in French
public policy, the Appellate Body concluded that controlled use is not a reasonably available
alternative. In response to Canada's argument that the panel should have articulated the cred-
ibility associated with different elements of scientific evidence, the Appellate Body noted that
a Member may ... rely, in good faith, on scientific sources which, at that time, may
represent a divergent, but qualified and respected, opinion. A member is not obliged,
in setting health policy, automatically to follow what, at a given time, may constitute a
majority scientific opinion. Therefore, a panel need not, necessarily, reach a decision
under Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994 on the basis of the "preponderant" weight of
the evidence.' 4
The panel had concluded that the TBT Agreement did not apply, because the challenged
measure did not establish technical standards for a product. Under this analysis, measures
adopted by WTO members would be subject to scrutiny if they establish product-performance
requirements as conditions for market access, but not if they prohibit access altogether. The
Appellate Body rejected this interpretation but nonetheless found that it could not com-
plete the analysis because the panel, owing to its error on the point of law, had not developed
sufficient facts.'5
The panel had received five unsolicited written submissions from nongovernmental organi-
zations (NGOs). Based on the Appellate Body's earlierjurisprudence, 6 the panel took two into
consideration. The Appellate Body, anticipating that it would receive similar submissions,
adopted its own "Additional Procedure," for this appeal only, concerning such submissions.
One of the three Appellate Body members hearing this appeal, not identified by name, made a concurring
statement in which that member questioned the principally economic nature of the "likeness" test. In this member's
view, at least in this case in which the evidence is overwhelming, the carcinogenicity of asbestos itself would be
sufficient to support a determination that that substance and alternatives to it are not "like." Id., paras. 149-54.
"J Cf European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Doc. NWT/
DS26/AB/R & WT/DS48/AB/R, para. 194 (Jan. 16,1998); see generally David A. Wirth, Case Report: European
Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, 92 AJIL 755 (1998).
" Appellate Body report, supra note 2, para. 178.
', Id., paras. 82, 83. The Appellate Body has no authority to remand a dispute to a panel if it cannot complete
the analysis itself based on the panel proceedings. See generally Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along with Rights:
Institutional Reform in the New GATT, 88 AJIL 477, 484 (1994) (noting that lack of remand authority "is under-
standable given the tight time constraints for the review process, but I cannot think of any analogous limitation
in any multitiered system of legal decision making").
" Cf United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. ''T/DS58/AB/R
(Oct. 12, 1998), reprinted in 38 ILM 118 (1999).
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Except for parties and third parties (that is, WTO members not party to the dispute), any or-
ganization or person wishing to submit a written brief was required to apply for leave in ad-
vance. In evaluating an application to submit a written brief, the principal substantive test
articulated by the Appellate Body was a showing of "what way the applicant will make a con-
tribution to the resolution of this dispute that is not likely to be repetitive" of what has al-
ready been submitted. 7
The Appellate Body received eleven timely applications from individuals and organiza-
tions such as chemical trade associations, environmental advocacy organizations, victims'
groups, public health professional societies, church groups, and university professors. The
Appellate Body denied them all "for failure to comply sufficiently with all the requirements"
set out in the Additional Procedure.'9
This report breaks new ground both in clarifying the "like product" determination in the
context of a national treatment analysis under GATT Article III and in defining the condi-
tions under which nongovernmental actors can provide input into WTO dispute settlement
proceedings. More generally, it is an important juncture in the evolving relationship between
law and policy affecting trade, on the one hand, and the environment and public health,
on the other.
Notwithstanding the outcome reached by the panel, environmental organizations severely
criticized the panel's report because of its "like products" analysis, which excluded health
and toxicity considerations.' 9 The Appellate Body's approach is probably somewhat more
welcome, but only one of the three Appellate Body members hearing the appeal thought
that health considerations alone would be sufficient to support the conclusion that asbestos
and alternatives to it are not "like." Even that member underscored the unusually serious
nature of the risks and the overwhelming strength of the evidence in support of asbestos's
carcinogenicity.2" Presumably this divergence of views as to the appropriate role of toxicity
in the "like product" analysis is one of the reasons that, in its discussion of Article XX, the
Appellate Body elaborated at length on the nature of the requisite standard scientific proof,
a recurring and sometimes rancorous issue in WTO dispute settlement. 2' In the end, how-
ever, the Appellate Body's treatment of the "like products" question has a context-depen-
dent, split-the-difference character that may be difficult for national governments to apply
to product regulation with any confidence as to the outcome in cases in which risks are less
clearly established."
Another major concern addressed in the instant dispute concerns the development of
processes for securing input from private parties into WTO dispute settlement proceedings,
an issue that has featured prominently in public criticisms of that process and also in recent
antiglobalization protests. As is the case with its analysis of "like products," the Appellate
Body's treatment of amicus submissions is equivocal in its long-term implications.
"7Appellate Body report, supra note 2, para. 52. Cf SUP. CT. R. 37.1 ("An amicus curiae brief thatbrings to the atten-
tion of the Court relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the parties may be of considerable help to the
Court. An amicus curiae brief that does not serve this purpose burdens the Court, and its filing is not favored.").
" Appellate Body report, supra note 2, para. 56.
"S ee, e.g., Daniel Pruzin & Peter Menyasz, Safety and Health Environmental Groups Criticize WFO Ruling on Asbestos
Ban, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1432 (2000).
"' Seesupra note 12. Separate opinions are untusual, if not previously unknown, in Appellate Body reports, a fac-
tor that itself tends to underscore the importance of the issue under consideration.
" Appellate Body report, supra note 2, paras. 176-81.
21 Cff Robert Howse & Elisabeth Tuerk, The WFO Impact on Internal Regulations: A Case Study of the Canada-EC
Asbestos Dispute, in THE EU AND THE WTO: CONSTITUTIONALAND LEGAL ASPECTS 283, 328 (Grainne de Burca and
Joanne Scott eds., 2001) (praising Appellate Body for "acting with judicial caution" and for "giving itself ample
room to craft a balance between internal and external legitimacy appropriate to the factors of [future] cases").
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The Appellate Body's priorjurisprudence had established that panels have the discretion
to accept unsolicited amicus submissions and that disputing state parties may append non-
governmental statements to their submissions to the Appellate Body.23 Building on its earlier
treatment of the generic question of participation by nonstate actors in WIO dispute settle-
ment proceedings, the Appellate Body's Additional Procedure in this dispute was a modest,
predictable, and logical next step. Nonetheless, after the Appellate Body announced that
it would accept applications for leave to submit briefs by NGOs, the IO General Council,
at the request of Egypt, acting on behalf of an Informal Group of Developing Countries,
held a special session on November 22, 2000, to discuss the additional procedures adopted
by the Appellate Body in this case. With the notable exception of the United States, the
comments from WTO member delegations were critical of the Appellate Body's new proce-
dure and questioned the desirability and legality of nongovernmental submissions. The
chair, reflecting the sense of the meeting, concluded that "the Appellate Body should exer-
cise extreme caution in future cases until Members had considered what rules were needed.
21
Under the circumstances, the Appellate Body's rejection of every request for leave to sub-
mit an amicus brief, through a process crafted for that purpose and by its terms intended
to be receptive to such submissions, is hardly surprising as a practical matter. The results of
the General Council meeting, while not expressly characterized as such, seem to have been
intended to influence the Appellate Body's procedural management of the instant dispute
settlement proceeding, which was pending at the time and had not yet been resolved by the
Appellate Body. If so, that effort was arguably successful, as demonstrated by the Appellate
Body's rejection of every nongovernmental submission made to it. The General Council's
criticism of the Additional Procedure in the instant case and the Appellate Body's apparent,
if undocumented, reliance on that action raise long-term questions of the appropriate sepa-
ration of rule-making and adjudicatory functions in a regime supposedly based on the rule
of law. At a minimum, the broader question of the prerogatives of nonstate parties in WTO
dispute settlement is now left in a highly uncertain state.
DAVID A. WIRTH
Boston College Law School
International criminal procedure-scope of ICTY appellate review-eyewitness credibility-reasoned
opinion by trial judges-adequacy offactual allegations in indictment
PROSECUTOR V. KUPRE KIC. No. IT-95-16-A. At <http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm>.
International Criminal Tribunal for the FormerYugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, October 23,2001.
In this unanimous appellatejudgment, an international criminal tribunal for the first time
ordered the release of defendants immediately after reversing their convictions. The case,
decided by the International Criminal Tribunal for the FormerYugoslavia (ICTY), arose out
of an attack in central Bosnia on April 16, 1993, in which Bosnian Croat forces killed more
than one hundred Bosnian Muslim civilians, injured many others, and destroyed property,
including two mosques. Count 1 of the amended indictment charged that from October
1992 until April 1993, six codefendants-including brothers Zoran and Mirjan Kuprekid
and their cousin, Vlatko Kupregki6'-had engaged in "planning, organising and implementing
"3 See generally David A. Wirth, Some Reflections on Turtles, Tuna, Dolphin, and Shrimp, 9 Y.B. INTL EN*v-L. L. 40,
46-47 (1998).
" See WTO Doc. WT/GC/M/60, para. 120 (Jan. 23, 2001), at <http://docsonline.wto.org/ge-home.asp>
(minutes of WTO General Council meeting of Nov. 22, 2001).
'This case report limits discussion to the Kupregki~s, the three codefendants who were released on appeal. An-
other codefendant, charged solely under count 1, had been acquitted at trial. SeeProsecutor v. Kupregki6, No. IT-
95-16, Judgment, paras. 766-69 (Jan. 14, 2000) [hereinafter Kupregki6 trial judgment]. The appeals chamber
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